Written By George Purdy
09/11/2025
Following a long series of wars that had drained the nation of much of its wealth, Sweden embarked on a new economic policy at the turn of the 17th century that sought to elevate Sweden from its relatively minor role in the international trade while consolidating its remaining imperial possessions in Europe. The Swedish elite therefore sought to monopolise trade in the Baltic Sea, beginning with Sweden’s primary exports of copper, iron and forest products such as timber and charcoal. As economic policy was refashioned under the reign of Gustav II Adolf, so too was foreign policy, with Sweden now seeking to employ the system of diplomacy that was gaining traction among the leading European powers. This modern system represented a break from the past, necessitating the creation of new institutions and the stationing of diplomats abroad for the maintenance of international relations. Foreign entrepreneurs and experts on trade and capital were utilised by the Swedish crown to make this transition, being tasked with the gathering of information on Sweden’s economic standing in the Baltic. According to Erik Thomson’s study on the culture of Swedish emissaries, commercial information occupied a prominent position in correspondence between Swedish diplomats in the early 17th century. The information acquired by new emissaries directly shaped foreign policy, particularly the view that neutralising the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was essential for the expansion of Sweden’s influence in the Baltic. Prompting the beginning of the First Northern War between the two nations, this conflict has been characterised by Baltic historian Bronius Dundulis as an economic struggle. Loosening its geopolitical encirclement, as of 1621 Sweden controlled Riga, a major Baltic port, and by 1627 Swedish diplomats were negotiating an agreement with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to resume trade between the two nations on Swedish terms. As such the status of Gothenburg and Stockholm as hubs for the trade of vital commodities such as iron, tar and pitch (the latter two being sourced from Finland) was boosted, as well as was Sweden’s dominance over Baltic trade routes. Moreover, England and the Netherlands, the foremost European trading powers during this period, became attracted to Sweden’s growing international clout, drawing Sweden into the heart of European affairs and affording it a newfound diplomatic influence.
Sweden’s prominence among the powerful trading nations of Europe grew exponentially as the 17th century progressed, with the Netherlands in particular becoming an important trading ally. Utilising the diaspora of Dutch Protestants in Sweden who had fled Spanish persecution, thereby boosting Sweden’s diplomatic presence in the Netherlands, these new diplomats became advocates for mercantilism and the potential for the two states to become one another’s primary trading partners. These diplomatic efforts soon bore fruit; by the middle of the 17th century 40% of all goods transported to Amsterdam came from the Baltic region. The Dutch trading empire also provided Sweden with a template for the expansion of its own trading interests, with Swedish diplomat Peter Flack meticulously reporting how the price of Dutch goods rose and fell. Louis de Geer, the most prominent Dutch diplomat in Stockholm, oversaw the expansion of steel and artillery trade between the two nations, with Amsterdam soon becoming the most important market for Swedish iron and ordnance. The Dutch therefore had an important interest in the protection of Swedish trade routes, leading to a coordinated attack on mutual enemy Denmark in 1644.
To further Sweden’s integration into European trade networks, the High Chancellor of Sweden, Axel Oxenstierna, brought about a shift in Sweden’s new foreign policy, arguing for the avoidance of over-reliance on any one nation, particularly the Netherlands. Swedish officials therefore sought closer relations with the other great maritime powers—particularly England, which was fast becoming reliant on Swedish iron. There was also a growing demand for Baltic wood products in England due to deforestation, accelerating the development of Anglo-Swedish relations. An increasing number of English diplomats were posted to Sweden and top Swedish officials such as John Leijonbergh were sent to represent the Swedish crown in London. Providing the Swedish government with information on trade with England, Leijonbergh gave officials the opportunity to outmanoeuvre the English as they tried to prioritise domestic products over imports. Countermeasures proposed in Westminster to curb the flow of Swedish iron into England, which could have damaged Swedish trading interests, were relayed to Stockholm, giving Leijonbergh the power to quickly negotiate the reduction of tariffs on Swedish iron from the proposed £3 per ton to 10 shillings, ensuring Swedish iron remained competitively priced and dominant in the English market. Building on these developments, in 1677 Abraham Cronström was sent to England as Assessor to the Swedish Board of Trade as an expert on Anglo-Swedish trade. He noted that trade with England could fill the void being left by the Netherlands as the number of Dutch ships entering the Sound declined due to stalling economic growth. Mutual interest in increasing trade in the Baltic led to the negotiation of an alliance between Sweden and England, as arranged by a group of Swedish diplomats headed by Peter Julius Coyet and Göran Fleming in collaboration with Charles II in London.
A further benefit of Sweden’s monopolisation of Baltic trade was the ability of Swedish diplomats to act as pragmatic negotiators with other powerful trading nations under the regency of Charles XI (1660-1697) and Foreign Minister Bengt Oxenstierna. Later dubbed ‘Bengt Oxenstierna’s political system’ in the later years of the 17th century, this system required the maintenance of Swedish neutrality and close trading relations with England, the Holy Roman Empire and the Netherlands. Diplomatic efforts to increase the commercial relevance of Sweden’s newly acquired ports of Narva, Reval and Stade were undertaken, successfully persuading English and Dutch traders to abandon their trade through the port of Archangel in exchange for trading concessions. Sweden thus consolidated its hold over these new territories through their strategic trade alliances with major European powers.
As diplomatic historians shift their focus away from the study of the nation state and towards the complex network of people and processes by which international relations are maintained, the development of modern diplomacy is receiving renewed attention. Viewed through this framework, it is clear that the reorientation of Swedish foreign policy towards the Baltic region in the 17th century did not occur in a vacuum but resulted from the Swedish export of raw materials and the incorporation of new Baltic ports into the Swedish Empire. Baltic trading interests determined the efforts of Swedish diplomats to forge alliances, neutralise hostile states and negotiate agreements throughout the long 17th century, a pattern that changed only with the irrevocable decline of Sweden’s regional power during the 18th century.
Bibliography
Gooskens, Frans. “Sweden and the Treaty of Breda in 1667: Swedish diplomats help to end naval warfare between the Dutch Republic and England.” Forum Navale, no.74 (2018): 54-82.
Kotljarchuk, Andrej. “In the Shadows of Poland and Russia: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European Crisis of the mid-Seventeenth Century.” PhD Dissertation, Södertörns högskola, 2006.
Lockhart, Paul. Sweden in the 17th Century. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017.
Natharius, Edward William. “The Maritime Powers and Sweden 1698-1702.” Thesis, Indiana University, 1959.
Roberts, Michael. The Swedish Imperial Experience 1560-1718. Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Sowerby, Tracey A. “Early Modern diplomatic history.” History Compass 14, no.9 (2016): 441-456.
Thomson, Erik. “Commerce and French and Swedish emissarial cultures during the 17th century.” Scandinavian Journal of History 31, no.2 (2006): 151-172.
Åström, Sven-Erik. From Stockholm to St. Petersburg: Commercial Factors in the Political Relations Between England and Sweden 1675-1700. The Finnish Historical Society, 1962.
Åström, Sven-Erik. “Swedish Iron and the English Iron Industry about 1700: Some Neglected Aspects.” Scandinavian Economic History Review 30 (1982): 129-141.
Featured image credit: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Anonymous_Triumph_of_Charles_X_Gustavus.jpg
Retrospect Journal 
