Written By Roya Kenny
12/10/2025
The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), otherwise known as the bingtuan, was officially established in 1954 under Mao Zedong’s directive to “cultivate and guard border areas.” This article seeks to examine and argue for the significance of the creation of the XPCC in the consolidation of the Xinjiang Province into the PRC until its first dissolution in 1975. However, a reconstituted XPCC continues today as a paramilitary and economic state entity whose high involvement in human rights violations in the region have led to numerous sanctions by the EU, U.S, and U.K, amongst other nations. The XPCC’s original establishment was part of a more significant effort to ‘re-unify’ areas of China that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believed to be a threat to their newly gained power as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had only been established officially in 1949. Initially, the XPCC was mainly composed of demobilized soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), most of whom were Han Chinese, in contrast to Xinjiang’s local majority of Turkic-speaking peoples, including Uyghurs and Kazakhs. The multi-faceted nature of the XPCC allowed for the integration of civil and military institutions, the resettlement of Han Chinese, and the targeting of traditionally oppositional ethnic groups. These changes constructed a monopoly of power within the province. The CCP itself utilized various political measures after the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and allowed for a relatively fast transition of pro-PRC politicians into roles of power. However, the XPCC demonstrated a level of integration into the region that allowed for near complete authority, building on strategies used by Imperial China, specifically the Qing Dynasty.
The immense size of Xinjiang, which is one sixth of China’s area at 1.6 million square kilometers, makes it a considerable distance from central power in China. This has presented Chinese leadership with difficulties in maintaining political control of the region. As a result of these challenges, the Qing government sought a new solution. In 1831, the Qing government, in a reversal of previous policies, began encouraging the migration of Han immigrants to take up land in the region, some of which was confiscated, to support the military garrisons of the Qing. In 1834, the Qing Government began a campaign of urging the poor from China proper to move to Xinjiang. Historian Joseph Fletcher wrote that by the mid-1830s, some 200 Han Chinese merchants lived in Yarkant as permanent residents, with many others commonly trading in the region. These migrants formed the foundation of a Han Chinese-based economic hub where large military forces and Han civilians could partake in. In this way, the Qing government undertook a civil-military approach, melding together civilian and military institutions, to control Xinjiang.
With the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the CCP sought to assert control over Xinjiang and moved quickly to replace Xinjiang’s native political leaders, eliminating significant possible opposition and ensuring a smoother transition to CCP authority into leading roles. To CCP leadership, the “local minority nationalism” was seen as a “problem” in maintaining control of the region. As historian James Milward puts it, “Uyghur leaders were systematically excluded from positions of authority as Han colonists took over the reins of power.” This political maneuvering allowed for a loss of representation of those native to the region and made it more difficult to develop political opposition.
Further, the CCP sought control of information, including the press and media sources. For example, eleven key leaders of Turkic ethnicity in Xinjiang Province died in a plane crash in August of 1949. The cause of the plane crash is controversial as this tragic outcome was highly beneficial for CCP leadership, who wished for former Xinjiang leadership to submit to the PRC. However, the release of the news of the deaths of these leaders did not reach the media and news sources until December of 1949, leaving the political climate very vulnerable for many months and allowing the PLA to secure power by having other appointed leaders submit to the control of the PRC.
Ultimately, eliminating possible political opposition allowed the PRC to gain rapid political dominance over the province. Maintaining secrecy over the deaths of possible political opposition for many months allowed the PLA to advance into the region and force the submission of alternate leaders to the PRC. This political maneuvering was very important to the initial consolidation. However, it only served to put short-term political power into the hands of the PRC. To significantly consolidate and maintain an ever-increasing authority over Xinjiang, the CCP would have to create, or rather continue, an establishment that could systematically increase control over civilians through all government sectors. This concept is what would soon become the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.
The official establishment of the XPCC in 1954 saw the rise of a corps of, initially, mostly demobilized soldiers, that emphasized a continuation of a manner of control from Imperial China. Mao commanded in his Decree to the First Agricultural Division of Xinjiang in 1952. While agriculture is to be taken up, weapons are in “reserve,” implying continued militance despite a more ‘agricultural’ focus. This dual nature contributed to the strategy of continuing a civil-military integration in the Xinjiang Province to aid consolidation.
Initially, the formation of the XPCC may be seen as necessary for sustaining PLA troops and resources. Specifically, the XPCC established farms, built public works, and created large-scale settlements to support the growing troop presence. However, the nature of the XPCC eventually put the building blocks in place to control civilians in Xinjiang more thoroughly than before. These building blocks included an increase in capacity for military personnel, a broader control over agriculture and the economy, and an establishment of infrastructure for Han resettlement. These components of control by China, originally developed under Qing rule, had not only returned but were amplified, allowing the PRC to consolidate further and maintain power within the province. This gave way to firm control in all sectors of what could be considered an alternative regional government. The XPCC quickly entrenched itself in the region through a rapid ascent to power by increasing its numbers from 200,000 in 1954 to 300,000 by 1956, including 10 agricultural divisions and 3 engineering construction divisions.
An essential part of establishing settlements was facilitating immigration to the province, further strengthening the numbers of XPCC-affiliated civilians. Historically, Han Chinese had been immigrating to Xinjiang since 1832, with most being poor and in search of work on the land. The XPCC brought a sudden new influx of Han immigrants to Xinjiang. Increasingly, however, settlements created by the XPCC also took on hosting ‘educated youth’ in the 1960s and 1970s that were interested in attracting well educated and motivated immigrants. By facilitating the resettlement of both civilians and demobilized soldiers to settlements, the XPCC created a mechanism of both economic and military presence in the region. The multi-faceted nature of this alternative ‘government’ made a base from which to exponentially increase power and control and allow for the circumvention of the official regional government.
Additionally, suppression of the native population, which is primarily Turkic-speaking people and other minority groups, was a strategy used by the XPCC to consolidate power. The XPCC was made up mainly of Han, who were seen by the PRC as having “higher levels” of “political, economic, and cultural development.” This perception of cultural and ethnic superiority allowed for the justification of putting those deemed ‘inferior’ out of power.
This ethnic suppression led to significant numbers of Turkic peoples, mostly Kazakhs and Uyghurs, to flee China from this increasing subjugation, as seen in the 1962 Yi-Ta incident where some 60,000 fled from Xinjiang to the Soviet Union. In the aftermath, the XPCC established 58 border farms to prevent the further fleeing of Kazakhs and Uyghurs. Controlling the borders created an environment of fear in which it was increasingly more difficult for any notable protest to take place, as these events were often quickly suppressed. These border farms were meant as a barrier for both sides, not only to maintain the external border but also internally to keep people from fleeing Xinjiang. Using the XPCC, the PRC could increasingly use civilian means to exert control and suppress the native populations of Xinjiang.
“The XPCC has for many years shouldered both production and military duties, every member assuming the dual role of soldier and worker.” That is what the Chinese Cabinet wrote in the XPCC focused white paper in 2014, issued on the 60-year anniversary of the creation of the XPCC. While the province’s geographical positioning and historical differences may have originally made it difficult to maintain a strong government presence, the XPCC allowed for the PRC to overcome these constraints. The multi-faceted nature of the XPCC from its outset allowed for the self-sufficiency of the corps stationed there as well as providing an avenue in which to closely monitor and suppress civilians. Xinjiang Province is now one of the most heavily state controlled provinces of the People’s Republic of China.
Bibliography
Akira Haneda, “Introduction: The Problems of Turkicization and Islamization of East Turkistan,” Acta Asiatica 34 (1978): 1–21; and Joseph Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 10, Late Ch’ing 1800–1911, part I, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 35–106.
Cliff, Thomas Matthew James. “Neo Oasis: The Xinjiang Bingtuan in the Twenty-First Century.” Asian Studies Review 33, no. 1 (2009): 83–106. doi:10.1080/10357820802714807.
Donald H. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949–1977 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), p. 30
“Establishment, development and role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps,” China Internet Information Center, Online; “《新疆生产建设兵团的历史与发展》白皮书（全文）” [White paper “History and development of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps” (full text)], The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, October 5, 2014, Online..
Fletcher, Joseph. “The Heyday of the Ch’ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet.” Chapter. In The Cambridge History of China, edited by John K. Fairbank, 351–408. The Cambridge History of China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
James A. Milward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 271-272.
Li, Nan. Chinese Civil-Military Relations : The Transformation of the People’s Liberation Army. First edition., Routledge, 2006, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203087428.
Rudelson, Justin, and William Jankowiak. “Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang Identities in Flux.” In Xinjiang, edited by S. Frederick Starr, 1st ed., 299–319. Routledge, 2004. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315697949-17.
Liu, Shaoqi “关于民族区域自治问题” [Regarding the problem of ethnic regional autonomy’), in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi], in CCP Central Committee Document Research Office, ed., 新疆工作文献选编 [Xinjiang Work—Selected Documents], Beijing: CCP Central Committee Party Literature Publishing House, 2010 [original 1954], 120
Mao, Zedong “中共中央关于新疆问题给彭德怀的电报” [Telegram from CCP Central Committee to Peng Dehui regarding the Xinjiang problem] in CCP Central Committee Document Research Office, ed., 新疆工作文献选编 [Xinjiang Work—Selected Documents], Beijing: CCP Central Committee Party Literature Publishing House, 2010 [original 1949], 21.
Seymour, James D. “Xinjiang’s Production and Construction Corps, and the Sinification of Eastern Turkestan.” Inner Asia (White Horse Press) 2, no. 2 (2000): 171–93. doi:10.1163/146481700793647805.
Ziliao Xuanbian (Selected Compilation of Materials), n.p. January 1967 (Red Guard publication), in Michael Y.M.Kau and John K. Leung (comps), The Writings of Mao Zedong 1949– 1976, Vol. I, September 1949-December 1955, Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, 1986, 249.
Zhu, Yuchao, and Dongyan Blachford. “‘Old Bottle, New Wine’? Xinjiang Bingtuan and China’s Ethnic Frontier Governance.” The Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 97 (2016): 25–40. doi:10.1080/10670564.2015.1060760.
Featured Image Credit: Used by the Uyghur Human Rights Project, sourced from a state media report on the Bingtuan Museum in Shihezi.
Retrospect Journal 