The Rise and Fall of Wilsonianism

Black and white image of President Wilson.

Written by Eva Beere


‘America lives in the heart of every man everywhere who wishes to find a region where he will be free to work out his destiny as he chooses.’ 

President Wilson 

On 5 November 1912, Thomas Woodrow Wilson was elected the twenty-eighth President of the United States of America, ushering in a new era of economic reform, federal segregation, and national self-determination. Although his domestic policies, particularly his segregationist views, which hindered the career advancement of many black civil servants, are an undoubtedly shameful part of his legacy, his approach to international relations continues to influence American foreign policy today. Reflecting on the past one hundred years, Wilson embodied the American ideology; his administration generated excessive self-confidence in America’s ability to expand democracy globally, which became a consistent leitmotif in his successors’ foreign policy objectives.  

Born in antebellum Virginia, Wilson grew up in a devout Calvinist family, which instilled in him a great belief that he was predestined to carry out virtue in a sinful world. In the way that Wilson believed he was responsible for pursuing world order, he also saw America as a model for other countries. For Wilson, America had a God-given destiny to exert its influence around the world by promoting and establishing democratic institutions.  

Nowhere better is this theory exemplified than in the United States’ involvement in the Mexican War. In May 1911, President Diaz was overthrown by Madero and his revolutionary forces, ending more than thirty years of brutal suffering under him. Whilst Madevo tried to bring peace back to Mexico, many Mexicans fled to the southern states of America, resulting in a dramatic escalation of brutality and conflict along the border. The agreement made between the United States government and Mexico to peacefully transfer power to Huerta was tragically overridden when Madevo was assassinated in February 1913. As someone who held onto the strong principles of free elections and capitalism, this blatant display of anti-democratic ideals shocked Wilson, influencing his decision to intervene. On 23 April 1914, Wilson ordered US Marines to land at Veracruz, resulting in the deaths of three hundred Mexicans, leading to a widespread anti-American sentiment throughout Mexico. This belief that neighbouring countries genuinely desired US intervention is a crucial example of the excessive self-confidence that underpinned Wilson’s foreign policy strategy.  

Even after the defeat in Mexico, Wilson continued to advocate for America’s role as the world’s peacemaker. In his speech in New York City on 20 April 1915, he advocated for an ‘America First’ approach as a way to prepare America to become the key negotiator in the post-war peace settlements. He argued that whilst America should focus its energy on domestic agendas rather than intervening in the global conflict, this did not indicate American indifference towards the war; instead, Wilson was advocating for America to take a neutral role in the conflict, which would allow them to use reason, rather than force, to construct global peace after World War I. 

Even on the eve of America’s intervention in World War I, Wilson was still eager to emphasise America’s role in creating a long-lasting peace. In his Senate speech in January 1917, Wilson argued that ‘The guarantees exchanged must neither recognise nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak.’ This marked the start of his ‘peace without victory’ campaign, whereby he believed that only peace between equals could last. Here, he outlined his plans for post-war reconstruction in Europe; regardless of the outcome, all nations deserved the right to determine their own polity, and thus there should be an equality of rights between nations.  

This detachment narrative continued even after his declaration of war in April 1917, following the sinking of the RMS Lusitania by a German submarine. Despite leading the United States into war on the Allied side, he maintained the idea that America was fighting as an associate rather than an ally. Presenting the United States as ‘one of the champions of the rights of mankind’ allowed Wilson to justify American intervention, whilst simultaneously maintaining the nation’s role as the post-war peacekeeper.  

Therefore, in the aftermath of World War I, Wilson believed it was America’s responsibility to draw up the new map of Europe, as America was the only nation that wanted nothing personal from the war, other than global peace. The plan for post-war European construction was drawn up in a secret office in the New York Public Library, where a group of experts began working on ‘The Inquiry.’ The main aim of the study group was to prepare essential materials and documents for the upcoming peace negotiations. The recommendations drawn up by the group for a comprehensive peace settlement allowed Wilson to present a series of Fourteen Points to Congress in January 1918. These encouraged open diplomacy, equal trade conditions, national self-determination, and ended with a suggestion to establish the League of Nations. This was an entity he argued was needed to ensure ‘that no other nation may ever plot such a thing against humanity and civilisation.’ Underpinning Wilson’s Fourteen Points was his undying belief that reason and law could be used to bring a new and lasting order to post-war Europe. This faith in reason stemmed from the success of the progressive movement in the United States, which brought such order to the nation. Whilst Wilson wanted to implement this in Europe, Peter Beinhart characterised his approach as a ‘hubris of reason,’ arguing that ‘it was because of their success rationalising government at home that reformers dared imagine they could rationalise the entire globe.’  

The emphasis on American exceptionalism, which the Wilson administration embodied, represented three problems: firstly, it assumed that the American model of democracy is superior to other global ideologies, secondly, that other countries were willing to adopt this foreign governance and belief system, and thirdly, that America had the economic and military strength to implement this globally.  

Nevertheless, this excessive self-confidence became a consistent theme in American foreign policy. After a string of isolationist Presidents, Roosevelt sought to re-emphasise America’s exceptional position in the world. Although FDR’s policies drastically differed from Wilson’s, not least because he believed that the post-war world should be built on power rather than reason, his Four Policemen Theory demonstrated a continuation of a Wilsonian hubris which saw America as a global peacemaker.  


Bibliography

Beinart, Peter. The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris. New York: HarperCollins, 2010. 

Library of Congress. n.d. “The War Against Huerta.” In The Mexican Revolution and the United States. Accessed September 25, 2025. https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/mexican-revolution-and-the-united-states/war-against-huerta.html 

Zoellick, Robert B. America in the World: A Definitive History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy. New York: Twelve, 2020. 


Featured Image Credit: By Harris & Ewing, photographer – Library of CongressCatalog: https://lccn.loc.gov/2016857913Image download: https://cdn.loc.gov/service/pnp/hec/16800/16849v.jpgOriginal url: https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2016857913/, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=159819182