Written by Louisa Steijger
The Nigerian Civil War, fought between July 1967 and January 1970, began as a regional secessionist movement that escalated into a brutal civil war between the Nigerian government and the Biafran state. The roots of the war can be traced to Nigeria’s colonial past. Nigeria, a vast and diverse country with over three hundred ethnic groups, had been administrated as two separate entities, Northern and Southern Nigeria, until they were amalgamated in 1914 under British colonial governor Lord Lugard. This artificial union forced together groups with distinctly different cultures, religions, and political structures. At independence in 1960, power struggles between the three dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani in the Muslim majority north, the Yoruba in the southwest, and the Igbo in the southeast, created profound instability. The uneven distribution of resources and infrastructure exacerbated these divisions, setting the stage for a fractured post-independence Nigeria.
These tensions exploded into violence in 1966, following two successive military coups. The first, in January, was led by predominantly Igbo military officers who overthrew Nigeria’s first democratic government, assassinating Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and other political leaders, most of whom were northerners. The coup was motivated by frustrations over corruption, economic disparities, and the perceived dominance of northern politicians. While the coup was not an exclusively Igbo conspiracy, it was widely perceived as an attempt to eliminate northern hegemony. In retaliation, northern officers led by Lt. Colonel Murtala Muhammed launched a countercoup, also known as the July Rematch. Over seven thousand Igbos were massacred in the north, and over a million fled to the eastern region. Consequently, on 30 May 1967, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military governor of the Eastern Region, declared the independent Republic of Biafra. The Nigerian government, under General Yakubu Gowon, viewed this as a direct threat to national unity. Gowon, a Christian from Nigeria’s middle belt, had been expected to serve as a unifier, stabilising the Nigerian Federation; however, his failure to prevent the massacre of Igbos following the countercoup led to calls for Biafran secession. The prospect of Biafran independence threatened the fragile federation, and given the diverse ethnic composition of Nigeria, Gowon believed that allowing secession would have set a precedent for other groups. Therefore, determined to crush the movement, the Nigerian government launched a military offensive and imposed a blockade. While the motivation for the blockade was framed by the Federal Government as one to prevent the supply of arms, the blockade cut Biafra off from essential supplies, most importantly food and medicine. This economic strategy had catastrophic consequences, resulting in the death of an estimated one to three million Biafrans; of this figure, approximately ninety per cent died from starvation. The use of starvation as a military weapon is exemplified in a statement that was released by Vice Chairman of Nigeria’s Federal Executive Council, Obafemi Awolowo, who stated, “All is fair in war, and starvation is one of the weapons of war. I don’t see why we should feed our enemies fat, only to fight them harder”. Awolowo’s statement highlights how the Nigerian Federal Government used famine to force Biafra to surrender.
It is important to note that geopolitical interests significantly shaped international responses to the civil war. Britain was still deeply involved in Nigeria following independence and, thus, supported the federal government, prioritising stability and territorial integrity over the dire humanitarian situation in Biafra. The support of the Federal Government, which manifested in Britain’s supply of arms to Nigeria, was also underpinned by economic fears associated with disrupting Nigeria’s oil supply to the UK. In contrast, France saw an opportunity to weaken British influence in West Africa and covertly supported Biafra. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) refused to intervene, adhering to their principle of non-interference. Newly independent African nations largely feared that supporting Biafra’s secession would encourage separatist movements in their own states, and thus, only Tanzania, Gabon, Zambia, and Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) recognised Biafra. Geopolitically, Cold War dynamics deterred the United Nations (UN) from involvement, as both the Western and Eastern blocs supported Nigeria. Furthermore, the UN lacked the mechanisms and the political will to act in a conflict framed as a domestic civil war, leaving the provision of humanitarian aid to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) instead.
The images of children with swollen stomachs, their bodies ravaged by kwashiorkor (severe protein malnutrition), flooded global media, drawing unprecedented international attention to the conflict. These images created a sense of outrage and urgency that compelled international action from religious organisations, NGOs, and ordinary civilians. Notably, the use of photography to display humanitarian suffering established a precedent for media-driven humanitarianism that would influence responses to later crises in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Syria. However, the ability of humanitarian organisations to respond to the Nigerian Civil War was complicated by the political complexities of the war, in which the Nigerian Federal Government imposed strict restrictions on aid out of fear that it would prolong Biafra’s resistance. As a result, organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found themselves caught between the basic humanitarian principle of neutrality and the harsh realities of war. The ICRC, which traditionally operated with the consent of warring parties, struggled to secure permission from the Nigerian government to deliver aid to Biafra. The Federal Government viewed the Red Cross with suspicion, fearing that relief flights could be used to smuggle weapons or aid Biafran forces. The ICRC’s insistence on working through official Nigerian channels severely limited its ability to provide meaningful assistance, as the government either delayed or outright denied access to affected areas. Meanwhile, Biafran leaders, desperate to secure aid by any means necessary, grew frustrated with the ICRC’s cautious approach and increasingly turned to alternative channels for relief. With the ICRC effectively sidelined, religious groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) stepped in to fill the humanitarian void. Catholic and Protestant organisations, including Caritas and the World Council of Churches, took the lead in relief efforts, organising one of the largest civilian-led humanitarian operations in history: the Biafran airlift. Volunteers and aid workers organised nighttime flights to deliver food and medical supplies, navigating poorly lit airstrips and evading Nigerian air attacks. The scale of the operation was immense and involved thousands of flights; by 1969, it was estimated that two hundred and fifty tonnes of food were delivered to Biafra each night.
Out of the context of the Nigerian Civil War emerged a new form of neo-humanitarianism that sought to not only provide aid but also challenge political structures that perpetuated suffering. A well-known humanitarian organisation that emerged from the context of the Nigerian Civil War was Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), also known as Doctors Without Borders. MSF was founded in 1971 by Bernard Kouchner, a French doctor stationed in Biafra who had become disillusioned with humanitarian inaction. He argued that neutrality in the face of atrocities amounted to complicity, and thus, he believed that humanitarian organisations had a moral obligation to speak out against suffering. MSF rejected strict neutrality, prioritising direct medical assistance and advocacy. This shift toward interventionist humanitarianism became the cornerstone of MSF’s operations, enabling the organisation to carry out missions in war zones and disaster-stricken regions worldwide, operating then, as it does now, independently of government constraints and diplomatic considerations. Therefore, the Nigerian Civil War reshaped humanitarianism, exposing its limitations and inspiring a new era of intervention that continues to influence modern-day responses to global crises.
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