Written by Yael Frankie
In 1979, the Iranian Revolution, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, resulted in the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty and the establishment of an Islamic Republic. Following this insurgency, Khomeini reshaped Iran according to Islamic principles, with gender relations being a central target. In this article, I will aim to examine the extent to which the revolution changed the roles and rights of Iranian women, proposing that Khomeini’s rule significantly curtailed women’s economic and personal autonomy, with the most profound effects being on middle- and upper-class women.
Within the Shah’s regime, it appears that women enjoyed relative freedom. His ‘White Revolution’ aimed to introduce policies and organisations that would make Iran progressive, of which reforms to family law were some of the most important. Particularly, ‘The Family Protection Law’ (FPL) of 1968 granted women greater rights in divorce and custody and imposed restrictions on polygamy. Additional laws also enabled women’s entry into the workforce, such as expanding female access to higher education and government jobs. These measures provided women with tools to navigate Iran’s patriarchal society with greater independence. However, this supposed commitment to women’s rights was limited, as is evident in the Shah’s own belief that women’s natural endowments made them more suited to maintain within the private sphere as mothers and wives but, if strictly required, they should be allowed to enter within society. Upon examination then, these policies, rather than fundamentally challenging patriarchal structures, primarily served to project an image of Iran as a modern nation, aligning with the Shah’s broader political ambitions rather than a genuine commitment to gender equality. Moreover, the impact of these policies was uneven.
Firstly, the emancipatory impact on rural women was minimal due to ignorance on legal rights and the mismatch between state policies and the realities of rural women’s lives. This is exemplified in Haleh Esfandiari’s interviews with Iranian women regarding the FPL. Zohreh, notes: ‘I am sure that lower-class women knew [about the FPL] but they did not know how to go about it. There was a lack of awareness or maybe the law was not attuned to the needs of the people it was meant to serve.’
Secondly, despite these laws, patriarchal attitudes and structures persisted. In Esfandiari’s interviews, the professional women exhibited strong self-confidence and ambitious career aspirations, attributing their success to personal merit and effort. Yet, they also note that they still existed within a male-dominated society where they were often perceived more as pretty objects as opposed to serious employees. Thus, while the Shah’s policies expanded opportunities and autonomy within the family, they did not fundamentally challenge Iran’s patriarchal structures nor adequately reach all levels of society.
Conversely, Khomeini sought to reverse the ‘Western’ and ‘anti-Islamic’ policies of the Shah, specifically those regarding women, as he emphasised the family as the ‘fundamental unit of society’, with women playing a central role in upholding its moral virtue. Very quickly Khomeini began a purification of policies. While this affected many areas of women’s life, here I’ll examine women’s positioning in the workforce and divorce law, as these are closely related to women’s autonomy. One of the earliest changes under Khomeini was the removal of Westernised professional women from the public sector, aiming to keep men and women within their respective sphere. As a result, the percentage of women in the active labour force declined from 20.27 per cent in 1976 to 10.27 per cent in 1986. While other factors such as economic downturn played a role in this decline, policies explicitly discouraged women from working, with measures such as financial incentives for husbands whose wives resigned and campaigns to remove women deemed ‘morally decadent’ from jobs. Yet, when assessing the impact in different sectors of the economy, a more nuanced picture emerges. While the number of women working in manufacturing declined sharply, their presence in the services industry, mostly in education and healthcare, increased due to gender segregation policies that required female professionals to serve female clients. Educated women, often middle and upper class, then retained the opportunity for employment, though within restricted fields highlighting limited autonomy. Rural women too joined the workforce, but unlike salaried educated women, many rural women engaged in unpaid work in agriculture, the craft industry or home-based labour. This is particularly significant since without an income women were entirely dependent on their male relatives, severely restricting their economic autonomy. It has been argued that ideological forces were not a primary factor in shaping rural women’s employment post-revolution. Since the Shah’s modernization efforts had minimal influence on women, granting them little financial independence even before the revolution, the impact of Khomeini’s policies on their economic roles was less significant. The contrast between urban and rural women highlights the revolution’s uneven effects. While rural women’s economic dependency remained largely unchanged, urban women, who had gained financial independence under the Shah, experienced significant setbacks in economic autonomy. Thus, Khomeini’s policies had a profound impact on urban, middle- and upper-class women, reducing their presence in the workforce and reinforcing traditional gender roles, limiting their autonomy significantly.
Another major area affected by Khomeini’s reforms was marriage and divorce law, which sought to return marriage and divorce laws to what he considered Islamic principles. Khomeini abolished the FPL, effectively reverting the country to the 1931 Civil Code. This rollback removed key restrictions on polygamy and marriage, reinforcing a more patriarchal family structure. Khomeini viewed divorce as belonging to men, resulting in women only being able to divorce under very specific circumstances. This marked a stark contrast to the Shah’s era, where the FPL had granted women expanded rights in this regard. Furthermore, the handling of divorce cases underwent a structural transformation. Cases lacking mutual consent were no longer heard in family protection courts, but instead in special civil courts presided over by Islamic judges. This led to a religious and male bias, considering the restrictions on women’s employment, which disadvantaged women’s position. For rural women, who were more likely to be illiterate or have knowledge about the law, there was also a lack of assistance. Moreover, while the courts prided themselves on reconciling sixty-five per cent of divorce cases, this frequently required pressuring women to remain in unhappy or even abusive marriages.
Conversely, even when mutual consent was required, women often faced coercion, as men could pressure them into agreeing to a divorce, putting her into a precarious position in a society which was not made for women without men. Women were then disadvantaged in a discriminatory, patriarchal legal system during divorce proceedings. They also lacked personal autonomy to enact a divorce as well as lacking agency when they did not want a divorce as they were coerced into giving their consent. Moreover, these frameworks reinforced perceptions of women’s subjugation, influencing both the supply, women needed their husbands’ permission to work, and demand for female labour, employers preferred men. Ultimately, the post-revolutionary changes to divorce law reinforced women’s subordination within marriage, limiting their ability to exercise personal autonomy.
These changes in employment and divorce spoke towards the broader conservative shift within the society Khomeini was constructing, one which wished to keep women and men within their respective roles, although these respective roles required women to be within the private sphere, limiting her autonomy. For many women this changed the extent of their freedom compared to prior the revolution, however, women from more traditional families expressed the opposite as under the new regime their families trusted the social mores within society, allowing them a greater autonomy to explore this society further. Importantly, however, this is an autonomy which is still restricted by patriarchal influence as these women require the permission of the male heads of their family to be entitled to this mobility. This provides an interesting perspective, however, highlighting the difference among women in how the revolution impacted them.
Through this analysis of employment and divorce law it becomes clear that Khomeini’s policies restricted women’s economic and personal autonomy, especially compared to the regime of the Shah’s. However, the liberal agenda of the Shah should not be overstated. Both before and after the revolution, women were subjugated to a patriarchal order. Although importantly this was more severe under Khomeini, as noted by a woman in Esfandiari’s interviews, ‘After the revolution the issues are so much more tangible, they have become part of our daily life’. Moreover, the revolution did not impact all women in the same way. While urban middle- and upper-class women, who had benefited the most from the Shah’s modernisation efforts, faced the greatest losses. Yet, the impact on rural women was minimal and for some traditional women the revolution brought a bigger degree of freedom. The changing position of women after the revolution provides a nuanced picture, yet one that reveals a limited autonomy for all women post-revolution. Then, Khomeini’s rule significantly curtailed women’s autonomy, particularly in the workplace and family life, with the most profound effects on middle and upper-class women.
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