Written by Louisa Steijger
The Bosnian War, which took place between April 1992 and December 1995, was a direct consequence of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, a federation established in the aftermath of World War Two (WWII). Yugoslavia’s collapse stemmed from the collapse of Communism, the conclusion of Soviet dominance within Eastern Europe, and the death of its leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980. Yugoslavia was comprised of diverse ethnic groups, including Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Serbs, Croats, and other minorities. The clash of these ethnic groups was exacerbated by Slovenia and Croatia’s declaration of independence in June 1991, which set the stage for conflict as both Republics sought to break away from the Yugoslavian federation. The aftermath of these declarations resulted in a brutal war in Croatia, in which Serb-dominated areas sought to secede and join the Serbian state. Ultimately, the dissolution of Yugoslavia led to a resurgence of nationalist sentiments among its constituent republics and resulted in three ethnic wars. Of these, the Bosnian War was the most destructive.
In February 1992, Bosnian Serbs, who feared marginalisation in an independent Bosnia, boycotted an independence referendum. However, this boycott failed to prevent its declaration in April 1992. The quick recognition of Bosnia’s independence by the international community fuelled tension among the Bosnian Serbs; backed by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), the Serbs rejected the new state and launched an armed rebellion. The Bosnian Serbs aimed to create an ethnically Serb state within Bosnia and Herzegovina through acts of aggression and territorial conquest. The conflict was marked by widespread atrocities, including ethnic cleansing, mass killings, sexual abuse, and rape. The culmination of atrocities is represented in the Srebrenica massacre, whereby on the 11th of July 1995, the Srebrenica enclave and town in eastern Bosnia, which was a UN safe zone monitored by UN Blue helmets, fell into the hands of General Ratko Mladic’s Serb nationalist force. The Serbian forces forcibly relocated women and children and massacred 7,079 Muslim Bosniak men. The events of Srebrenica illustrated the failure of Europe to act to avert the single most genocidal act since WWII.
For Europe, the Bosnian War represented a crisis on its doorstep, yet the response was fragmented and hesitant. The European Union, still in its nascent stages of foreign policy coordination, sought to employ diplomacy and humanitarian aid rather than military intervention. While these responses had the potential to reduce the atrocities of the Bosnian War, they were ultimately undermined by institutional constraints and international divisions within the Union. The EU is composed of a variety of vertical and horizontal levels of institutions and, as a result, is an immensely complex governance structure that faces significant challenges regarding coherence and unity. A lack of EU coherence can arguably be ascribed to the fact that the EU must reconcile simultaneous institutional influences, views, and actions. Britain, France, and Germany, three of the European Union’s most influential states, struggled to form a unified approach. Britain and France, wary of the complexities of ethnic conflict and unwilling to commit troops to a potential quagmire, favoured containment and arms embargoes despite their inherent ineffectiveness. Still grappling with its post-reunification identity, Germany took the unprecedented step of recognising Slovenia and Croatia early on, which some argue exacerbated tensions by emboldening nationalist sentiments. The European approach was marked by a reluctance to take decisive action, constrained by the limitations of the United Nations and internal divisions within the EU. The result was an ineffective strategy that allowed atrocities to unfold, culminating in the failure to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica.
It is useful to explore the Dutch response to the Bosnian War. Like other European nations, the Netherlands grappled with questions regarding the effectiveness and ethical implications of arms embargoes, the recognition of newly emerging states within the former Yugoslavia, and the use of airstrikes. Ultimately, the nation’s response reflected broader debates within the EU about the balance between protecting civilian lives and further destabilising the area. In analysing the role of the Netherlands in the Bosnian War, it is crucial to explore its participation in United Nations Peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Dutch troops, known as Dutchbats, were deployed as part of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. Their role was to monitor ceasefires, deliver aid, and provide, alongside Canadian troops, a stabilising presence in conflict-affected area to deter further violence and protect the lives of civilians caught in the crossfire of the conflict. The Dutchbats’ most infamous assignment was in Srebrenica, a designated safe zone under UN protection. The Dutch troops were tasked with ensuring the safety and security of the civilian population in Srebrenica; however, the events of the July 1995 massacre reveal the failures of the Dutchbats. It is unfair to solely blame the Dutch troops for the massacre, given that they were both outnumbered and underequipped to deal with the Serbian attack. On the 6th of July 1995, days prior to the Srebrenica massacre, the Dutch forces had requested twice the implementation of NATO airstrikes to prevent Serbian advances; however, UN forces repeatedly rejected these requests. It was only on the 11th of July 1995, that airstrike requests were finally granted. Ultimately, this decision came too late and was ineffective in preventing the massacre. It is crucial to note that the Dutchbats, and by extension, the Netherlands, were in 2019 found guilty by the Dutch Supreme Court for failing to allow the roughly 350 Bosniak males to remain inside the compound after Mladić demanded that the Dutchbat surrender the Bosniak males inside the compound so that they could be screened for war crimes.
With the end of the Cold War, the US shifted its focus to dealing with domestic and economic issues at home, and thus, it viewed overseas conflicts through a lens of caution. The legacies of the Vietnam War and the quagmire of subsequent interventions, such as in Somalia, left a lasting impression on the minds of US policymakers, deterring them from military engagement and intervention abroad. To the US, the Balkans were not seen as a vital national interest in comparison to conflicts in the Middle East or Asia. Therefore, the Bosnian War did not pose a direct threat to American security or strategic interests. Furthermore, the lack of a clear exit strategy and strong concerns about being dragged into an ethnic conflict reduced political will within the US for military intervention. US Secretary of State James Baker’s assertion that the US had ‘no dog in this fight’ encapsulated Washington’s early ambivalence. Instead of taking direct military action, the US attempted to support European efforts, yet divisions within NATO and the EU hampered any effective response. The rejection of the ‘lift and strike’ policy, wherein the US proposed lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia while simultaneously launching airstrikes against Serbian positions, highlighted the discord between American and European strategic priorities. Britain and France, unwilling to risk the safety of their peacekeepers on the ground, opposed the plan, further delaying a forceful response to the war.
However, the events of 1995, in which the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina reached a breaking point, necessitated US involvement. The fall of Srebrenica and the realisation that European-led peacekeeping efforts had failed prompted the Clinton administration to take decisive action to end the bloodshed and hold the perpetrators accountable. Consequently, on the 30th of August 1995, NATO, under US leadership, launched Operation Deliberate Force, a sustained bombing campaign targeting Bosnian Serb military infrastructure. This military intervention, in combination with the advancement of Croatian troops on the ground, forced Serbian leaders to partake in US negotiations. The result was the Dayton Accords in December 1995, which brought an end to the war and established a new political framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Arguably, US intervention marked a significant departure from its earlier reluctance to engage militarily in the region. Its role in brokering the Dayton Accords underscored the importance of leadership in addressing complex security challenges and promoting peace in the Balkans.
An analysis of the Bosnian War reveals the complexities of international intervention, particularly in conflicts underpinned by ethnic tensions. The European response, constrained by political fragmentation and institutional limitations, revealed the inadequacies of a purely diplomatic and peacekeeping approach in the face of genocidal violence. While late, the eventual US intervention demonstrated the necessity of decisive action when confronted with a humanitarian catastrophe. The divergent responses of the EU and US underscore Europe’s dependence on American leadership in matters of security and intervention, a reality that persists in contemporary geopolitics.
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Featured image credit: “File:Ruins of the Bosnian War in Mostar 007.jpg” by anjči is licensed under CC BY 2.0.
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