Written by Alexander Stroem
Content warning: Islamophobia. This article aims to give an objective history of the history of Islamophobia in Sweden.
“The Qurʾān burner Salwan Momika Dead in Shooting.” These words are a likely shock to all upon waking up on a Thursday morning (or before sleeping on Wednesday), particularly to Swedes. Supposed to stand trial on Thursday 30 January, Momika died the night before, shot in Södertälje, Southwest of Stockholm, on lake Mälaren. An avowed Atheist and critic of Islam of Iraqi origin, Momika had shaken the world earlier in 2023 with his acts of burning and desecrating the Qurʾān (including on Mynttorget in central Stockholm, next to riksdagen/parliament), the holy text of Islam, in line with similar acts by the Danish-Swedish far-right populist Rasmus Paludan. The acts reverberated globally: widespread condemnation and protests against Sweden and the government followed suit. Flags were burnt and boycotts ensued, followed by a diplomatic crisis with Turkey and NATO, and the weakening of national security. Widespread demands for an apology followed at global level, alongside legal change, and demands for Momika’s extradition to Iraq, challenging Sweden’s justice system and its legal framework surrounding the definition of a hate crime. More notably perhaps was the unfortunate violence suffered thereafter amongst several groups. Sweden in the last few decades has been a centre of rising far-right and anti-migratory rhetoric on the basis of its substantial immigrant population, the recent surge in urban violence, and the growing sense of Swedish-ness, particularly among the youth, coupled with the loss of said identity. Such ideas of a threatening “other”, based on a threefold system of fear, hate, and naivety, are far from new. Sweden has suffered such speech for decades, often following the rise of Swedish Nationalism and even orientalism in the 1940s. Within all subjects of hate, however uncomfortable, the past remains fundamental to its understanding and the context in which it was born. This article hopes to perhaps shed some light on that in the context of Sweden (where it is generally poorly documented), although also plausibly to other states as well.
A note is perhaps to be first made on the relationship with religion, state and personality in Sweden. Sweden has always been rather isolated. Not only is this isolation geographic due to its location in the North of Europe, accessible by Sea or by Finland, but also in the psychology and sociology of the Swede. Yet, religion in particular remains inherently personal in a state formally secular since 1995 (albeit beginning much earlier, notably since the 1950s), which defends the separation of church and state. Despite this, Christianity is evident in Sweden. Approximately 3500 churches, predominantly Lutheran-Church of Sweden and Free Churches, dot the landscape from north the south (particularly the latter), which for a scarcely populated country beyond the urban centres of Stockholm, Göteborg/Gothenburg, and Malmö among a few others, are an obvious sight. Nonetheless, while not to the legal extent of French laïcité, few Swedes are willing to touch on the matter (perhaps even less even go to church), believing it to be their own and no one else’s concern, particularly when a political tone is seen. As noted by several right-wing Sweden Democrat (Sverige Demokraterna, SD) parliamentarians in a 2023/2024 motion: “Religion is a private thing… For a secular country like Sweden, it is exceptionally important that politics and religion remain separate in the law… religious freedom also implies freedom from religion”.
Yet such secularism and indifference has posed a certain problem for Islam in Sweden. Catarina Kinnvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking (2011) remark that religion in Sweden “is not debated in any significant depth, which is illustrative of the fact that there is no centralized unit that has been given the responsibility and necessary competence to deal with Islam in all its complexity”. Indeed, despite the guarantee of religious freedom (since 1951), religion is nonetheless socially expected to maintain a secular approach. This has often led to conflict between various groups, whether the progressive and liberal left, the traditional, and often even nationalistic, right, and certain minority groups, including Muslims, often based on a lack of understanding over faith, symbology (notably with Muslim women) and fear over identities. While this a problem which is by no means limited to Sweden, the matter is evident. This has been further worsened by failed integration and the resulting cultural, economic and social exclusion faced by many Muslims in certain parts of Stockholm, Malmö and Gothenburg/Göteborg (although perhaps more obviously in smaller areas such as Eskilstuna and Södertälje). The overall environment created has been one of fear, naivety, and stereotypes, often seen as challenging to each group’s sense of community and cohesion. For simplicity’s sake, while far more complex in its inner workings, Islamophobia will be defined as a “Fear of Islam, exaggerated beliefs that Islam is a religion that leads to negative behaviors and that the presence of Muslims in a society is a danger”, as stated in a 2017 article and Nationalencyklopedin.
Islam and Sweden have a long, albeit complex, relationship stretching traditionally from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (if one in this case disregards earlier ninth-tenth century connections in the Viking period). Under the growing powers of the Vasa family and the initial beginnings of what may be deemed a recognisable “Swedish state”, Sweden began its first contacts with Islam through the Ottoman Empire and the Tatar states of what is today Russia. This history, small and often perhaps insubstantial in its historiography in contrast to other subjects of Vasa and early modern Sweden, presents certain initial moments of connection, and even anti-Muslim expression in Sweden. A particular point of remark is the Kristoffer med Kristusbarnet (St Christopher with Christ child) fresco in Gothem church in western Gotland. In presenting the saint with Christ, the artist likewise portrays the pope and a Turkish-looking figure (little distinction was made between Middle Eastern groups), deemed by many to be the Prophet Muhammad (Mahomet), about to drown, emphasising the threat of Islam via the Turks against the Lutheran “true” faith. Others have nonetheless suggested the painting to represent the Ottoman Sultan, perhaps Mohammed IV (1648–87), contemporary with the painting. Regardless of who is truly depicted, the alleged threat of Islam to the Swedish-Lutheran church is heavily suggested, a common motif of Islamophobic discourse that remains prevalent even today, albeit more so to Swedish identity itself rather than the church. Furthermore, this discourse was particularly seen in Swedish laws, notably of 1665, outlawing all faiths and religious practices other than the Swedish Lutheran Church, later decreed to be punished by banishment in 1734. Additionally, since 1686, Swedish citizenship was preconditioned on belonging to the Swedish church.
Years later, Muslim groups begin to arrive in Sweden more concretely from various states, predominantly Turkey and Russia. Religious minority groups had already been present in Sweden for a while, albeit more temporarily and for economic reasons. With the improvement in relations with the Muslim world and Ottoman Turks (even developing some customs in Swedish admiration for them) in the period of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) and the Great Northern War (1700–1721), Jews and Muslims alike were granted certain protected rights. In 1718, Jews and Muslims were granted the right to religious practice in Sweden, resulting in the development of a certain, albeit limited and temporary, population of both religious groups. While this may have been due to financial reasons based on a debt to the Ottoman Sultan following the stay of Karl XII in Istanbul from 1709 to 1714 during the Great Northern War, the decrees nonetheless resulted in nominal, yet widespread, settlement during the Gustavian Period in the 1770s onwards, following a period of renewed discrimination. Jews for instance, received the right to settle in around 1774 and 1782 with the Jewish Ordinance (Judereglementet). Small Jewish communities subsequently grew in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Norrköping, as well as in Karlskrona in Blekinge and Marstrand in 1775–1794 (as a Porto Franco, Free Port, where the first synagogue in Sweden was constricted in 1782 for around 20-30 Jewish families from Hamburg. It would be centuries until the first mosque was built in 1975–1976, although private worship is implied. Muslims on the other hand, are less well documented, generally limited to merchants and creditors in Stockholm, Göteborg, Lund, Strömstad, and Karlshamn, with perhaps some thirty families in the last alone. While seemingly little discrimination was faced, there is not much we can say concretely. There remains a remarkable lack of evidence, largely due to the limited nature of their stay and their lack of a Swedish identity. Muslims generally remained seen within the colonial and orientalist framework of “the other” and with suspicion and fear. In this sense, it appears little has changed since then.
By the 1900s, more permanent settlements had developed with Turkish and Tatar immigrants in the region. By the 1930 population census, some fifteen people were classified into religious category 31, “Muhammadans and other Asiatic congregations” (muhammedaner och andra asiatiska samfund), of which around eleven were considered Muslims and Sufis. As far as the Swedish population was concerned however, the Muslim population was largely unknown and remained part of the Oriental “other”, practicing privately in cellar-mosques (”källarmoskéer”) or their own homes. Few Swedes would even be generally aware of Islam and foreigners truly until the rapid growth of immigration in the 1970s due to Swedish industrial needs. Olof Palme, perhaps Sweden’s most famous albeit controversial Prime Minister (1969–1976; 1982–1986†), remarked on this growth as follows in his famous 1965 Christmas broadcast: he states that the new surge in immigration was:
“a completely new situation. Sweden has been a country from which people have sought to leave to foreign lands. Now people from other countries seek their way here to us. And we are not used to minorities. Unfamiliar with taking care of those who are different, that’s why we become awkward and blunt, both as a society and as individuals. And we have not yet put ourselves in the situation that arises when the immigrants have become a large and growing community of even greater significance for Swedish society.”
Palme, known for internationalist outlook and solidarity, was not wrong. By the 1980s, the Muslim Ummah numbered some thirty thousand, initially coming from Turkey and the then Yugoslav regions, followed by a second wave from Pakistan, Iran, the Arab world, Uganda, India, Afghanistan and Somalia. By 1992, this number had grown to ninety thousand (others suggest even 160,000). Such groups began to make a more concrete imprint on Swedish society, one which elicited a greater nationalist response of fear. In the 1980s, Swedish media began reporting on global events within the Islamic world, notably opposition groups and events such as the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Salman Rushdie Fatwa. With the above events, often associated with violence, the Swedish response to Islam gradually grew from indifference to a negative association with fear and stereotypes, growing further following events such as terror attacks.
In 1990, Håkan Hvitfelt surveyed the responses of Swedes concerning Islam. The responses are self-evident. While a mere two percent had a “very or rather positive attitude to Islam”, some 65 per cent were remarked to have a “rather or very negative attitude to Islam”. Various themes emerged in their responses; men and youths, notably of lower education levels and of more rural background, were particularly negative in their outlook, making particular reference to the “incompatibility” of Islam with democracy, its “oppression against women” and its expansiveness. This is perhaps not surprising at all, given that Swedish media at the time more often than not, (around 85 per cent of the time) reported on Islam in connection to violence, protest and unrest. With the events and aftermath of September 11, these feelings of prejudice and fear only rose. According to a study by the Integration Ministry (Integrationverket) circa ninety per cent of Swedish Muslims, despite repeatedly clarifying that they had nothing to do with the events and that they themselves were also victims, remark to have suffered discrimination after the above, both verbal and physical, similarly to the rest of Western Europe. Vandalism also occurred, particularly to mosques with graffiti and firebombs, although also with pigs’ heads and pigs’ blood being dumped outside. The newspaper Aftonbladet remarked, “Muslims are scared”, often being called “murderers” and being told that they “were not welcome” in Sweden. In a show of solidarity and in an attempt to calm the situation, Deputy Prime Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallén, and the Minister for Integration, Mona Sahlin, both of the Social Democratic party, visited the mosques, remarking it to be a “horrible” situation and condemning the violence. Since the early 2000s, there has been a rapid growth of anti-immigration news sites, blogs and communities, allowing for such discourses to spread more widely than anticipated.
While the discourse has lessened in violence and opinions have changed, much still remains the same since the early 2000s. The Sweden Democrats (SD), whose political positions oscillate between right-wing and occasional far-right populism (while also prone to conspiracy theories) may be particularly mentioned here. To denytheir success in recent decades would be to lie. They have grown more than any other party and consistently hold a third of parliamentary seats since their initial arrival to riksdagen in 2010. To Jan Guillou, an author and columnist for Aftonbladet controversial for his views on the United States and the Middle East, “without 9/11, we would not have any Sweden Democrats in parliament. Islamophobia is their source of strength.” Guillou’s argument is perhaps not entirely convincing given SD’s significant popularity even among other issues, yet he is not entirely wrong. While the majority of the party and its supporters profess a non-racial nationalism and a subsequently moderate opinion on Islam, defending it has never been part of its functionality. Many remain more steadfast in their desire for “Swedish” homogeneity, particularly with growing fears of the conspiracy theory of “Eurabia” and the apparent “Muslim takeover”, proven false on many occasions. One such example is Richard Jomshof, a Sweden Democrat and synth-pop keyboard player, formerly secretary and now chairman of the justice committee. In 2012, he made national and international headlines for a statement during a debate that “Muslims… want to take over Europe”, making particular reference to Islamism (which he himself fails to define) as a greater threat to Europe than Nazism. He recently repeated such actions (many times over) in 2023, remarking that Islam was an “antidemocratic, violence-promoting and misogynistic religion/ideology, founded by the warlord, mass-murderer, slave trader and bandit, Mohammed.” He was heavily condemned for his quotes and almost forced to resign. While Jomshof has never been alone in such ideas (it suffices to go on Twitter/X after major speeches or related events), as seen by Mattias Karlsson and Jimmie Åkesson and many Sweden Democrat supporter, such discourse is nonetheless a minority: members of all parties and non-parliamentarian Swedes, regardless of political orientation, have defended the right to religious freedom and practice to Muslims, and refuted such conspiracy theories. The rest, you know.
With both its past and present, Sweden faces an uncertain future. The topic of religion itself remains a rather personal and taboo topic among Swedes, regardless of faith. Beyond the problems of violence and exclusion, the various acts of islamophobia and the responses have challenged the very core of Swedish justice, multiculturalism, freedom of speech (Yttrandefrihet), and its constitutional definition in Grundlagarna and will keep doing so. While the law is likely to be changed, the extent of this is unknown, and those who have been convicted of their actions (e.g. Paludan in November 2024 for incitement to racial hatred after his actions in Malmö in 2022), have already declared their intention to appeal due to legal ambiguity. Indeed, the matter generally remains grounded on a threefold of common elements all relative to one another in an endless and complex cycle; fear, hate, and naivety. A similar structure may similarly be applied to other European states, notably the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and other Western European states. Although one might hope differently, such discourse seems unlikely to change in the near future and is only worsened by recent events, particularly the last three weeks.
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Featured image credit: “Grønland, Oslo – Norway” by Beatrice N. Kabutakapua is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.
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