Written by Connie Greatrix
The UK has always been against supranationalism, even before the rumblings of euroscepticism and Brexit, and has consistently pushed the boundaries of the EU. This has not, however, stopped the country from having a remarkable role in building and revitalising supranationalism within the EU (European Union, formed in 1992), even with the numerous obstacles and attempts to destroy it. The disagreeable entrance the UK made in joining the EEC (European Economic Community, formed in 1958) continued in its future dealings with the organisation, having parallel attitudes to those held within its previous failed and successful applications. This attitude may have ultimately prevailed with Brexit, but this has not prevented the continuation of supranationalism, often with the UK’s help.
The UK always wanted an intergovernmental organisation, the opposite of what the EU was created to be. After first refusing to take the lead on the formation of the ECSC (European Coal and Steal Community, formed in 1952), Britain watched on as the six members flourished under these conditions. This economic jealousy was not enough for the UK to give up its sovereignty (particularly in agriculture), until 1969 when it finally saw life outside the EEC to be too economically painful, and had done all it could to rival the Community from the outside.
The UK had made two previous applications until it was (reluctantly) accepted into the EEC. With the creation of the ECSC, the UK had quickly realised its inability to balance being part of a customs union (with a common external tariff) and keeping tariff-free trade within the Commonwealth. It initially prioritised its relationship with the USA and the Commonwealth but rapidly began to see this as a mistake with the massive economic growth happening within the EEC. This, combined with American pressure, pushed its priorities back towards the continent. After the initial creation of the EEC, the UK formed EFTA (European Free Trade Area) formed of Scandinavia, Portugal, Austria, and Switzerland. Immediately after, it submitted its first application to join the EEC in 1961, to the dismay of EFTA. This was rejected just as quickly, primarily because of its refusal to accept agriculture as part of the supranational community – something de Gaulle insisted upon due to the boost the French economy was getting because of CAP (Common Agricultural Policy). This inability to compromise on both sides led to a similar dismissal of its second application by de Gaulle in 1967 after the Empty Chair crisis. The UK was finally accepted after its rejection became too costly for de Gaulle’s CAP negotiations in 1969, after finally (begrudgingly) applying without conditions. This unwillingness became parallelled within its future responses to any deepening of the supranational community.
In entering the EEC, the UK widened (expanded EU membership) the Community further with the much more willing addition of Ireland. Due to the difficulties of the shared border (shown in the Brexit negotiations), this was a necessary step for a smoother transition into joining the EEC. Ireland saw this as an opportunity to escape British overreach and expand its economic markets. Whilst Britain saw the exchange of sovereignty to the EEC as a loss of great magnitude, Ireland did not recognise this and instead saw its sovereignty as something it never truly had.
As soon as Britain joined, it began to attempt to disrupt the supranationalism it had agreed to. This was most prominently shown in the rejection of social policies, with the UK and Denmark proving quite adept at quashing any semblance of Social Europe. Although both Major and Thatcher rejected the formation of Social Europe as a polity, some deepening was accepted in favour of its own individual policies. This was shown in the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, pushing for regional funds in response to the collapse of Northern industry. This compromised its push for intergovernmentalism, instead an act of deepening social policies. Thatcher had already made large concessions for the sake of trade liberalisation. In her push to rid the EEC of non-tariff barriers, Thatcher became stuck in a contradiction, wanting liberalisation without integration. She saw the acceptance of Qualified Majority Voting (essentially ending the regular use of the veto) as a means to produce her internal market, Thatcher accepted the Single European Act, thus allowing the Euro to come into fruition. This reasserted supranationalism with an empowered commission. These actions showed how even the most anti-integration Prime Ministers have caused profound change across the EEC.
John Major opposed social policy at every opportunity within the community, shown in the opposition to the Social Charter and the subsequent introduction of the concept of opting in to the policy outside of the EU treaty framework. However, this new concept arguably also caused deepening (an encroachment of supranationalism into other areas, further integration), and is still used today in difficult matters. This allowed for differentiated integration to occur without unanimity, and with strong opposition. Disruption continued throughout the twentieth century with the rejection of a passport union, and the rejection of the Schengen agreement (first outside of the EU framework), preventing Ireland from joining as a consequence. This shows how the UK, in its attempt to reduce integration, actually paves the way for further differentiated integration – a Europe of different speeds.
The UK continued its path of attempted disruption to supranationalism with the insistence on having a referendum on the European Constitution. This planned to replace previous treaties, but the use of the word ‘federation’ in the initial draft, caused widespread opposition to the idea. The UK was the first to put this to a referendum (although unrequired) meaning other countries felt compelled to follow. This led to the defeat of the Constitution in the Netherlands and France, preventing its implementation. This permanently placed the EU into the sphere of domestic policy. This was a successful disruption for the UK, preventing cohesive integration, and starting a new era of reluctance to ratify or even discuss new treaties. This could be the most prominent prevention of deepening by the UK.
That said, the UK was a leading promoter of the Eastern enlargement, which was the largest widening of the EU in history. Twelve candidates applied, and Britain and Denmark advocated for its joining with the hope that these numbers would dilute the EU into a free trade area, putting an end to further integration. This, however, backfired and instead caused the most extensive integration in history with the Copenhagen Criteria. This was formed of unprecedented demands and de facto interventions into these countries, with a vast increase in the required acquis communitaire. This was designed to prevent states from joining, but instead became the largest accession in history, although this may have failed in preventing further integration, many challenges have appeared in recent years due to this enlargement, with diverging foreign policy interests, corrupt uses of EU funds, and the rise of illiberal democracies. The EU has been left with few tools to combat this and enforce anti-corruption measures. The UK may have laid the path for the deepening of the EU at times, but it has also potentially laid the groundwork for its demise.
The UK never wished for supranationalism and attempted to destroy the concept from both outside and within the Community. Even with these attempts, the EEC continued to deepen and widen. Until Brexit, the UK continued to give up more sovereignty to the supranational cause to further its own interests, from economic liberalisation to regional funds, causes worth this sacrifice. Supranationalism prevailed, and was often pushed forward by its biggest critics, revitalised at times by the UK. Destruction of the core values of the EU failed, and supranationalism only grew.
Bibliography
Andrew D. Devenney, ‘Joining Europe: Ireland, Scotland, and the Celtic Response to European Integration,1961-1975, ’Journal of British Studies 49 (Jan. 2010)
Duccio Basosi, “The European Community and International Reaganomics,1981-1985,”in Kiran Klaus Patel, Kenneth Weisbrode, European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s (Cambridge, 2013)
Jan van der Harst, ed., Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community’s Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969 – 1975 (Brussels: Nomos, 2007)
Nick Startin and André Krouwel, ‘Euroscepticism Re-galvanized: The Consequences fo the 2005 French and Dutch Rejections of the EU Constitution, ’Journal of Common Market Studies 51, 1(2013)
Wilfried Loth, ‘Negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, ’Journal of European Integration History (2013)
Retrospect Journal 