Written By Freddie Webb
Since its conclusion, the Vietnam War has been subject to much historiographical debate centred primarily around two schools of thought: Orthodox and Revisionist historians. Orthodox historians argue the war was always unwinnable and unjust (George Donelson Moss claims the USA’s campaign was ‘doomed to fail from the outset’). They claim it lacked fundamental strategic importance in the Cold War and that America’s military strategy was unsuited to the conditions in Vietnam. Alternatively, Revisionist thinkers argue that American victory was attainable had it not been for tactical blunders and poor decision-making. This view suggests the sheer size of America’s fighting potential could and should have overwhelmed Vietcong forces, had its employment been tactically and operationally sound. When exploring this avenue of thought, one encounters the domestic and political pressures which forced President Johnson into military indecision and tactical errors. Anti-war sentiment, looming elections and ‘Red-Scare’ threats encouraged poor decision making and created a military campaign fraught with inconsistencies. Thus, when reviewing the reasons behind America’s struggle in Vietnam, one must acknowledge the political forces underpinning decision making in Washington.
Primarily, President Johnson was constantly worried about his public approval at home. Having only been appointed, not elected, to the position of President due to his predecessor JFK’s mid-term death, Johnson’s popularity had not yet been openly tested by the public and as a result, he was eager to contest the 1964 election. To do so, he had to carefully manoeuvre his way around the Vietnam issue. He could not advocate disengagement because opponents like Nixon and highly respected journalist Joseph Alsop would have branded him an ‘appeaser’ or ‘communist’, especially when placed against the backdrop of McCarthyism and the ‘Red-Scare’. On the other hand, the general public would not have warmed well to Johnson sending their young boys to fight abroad with little reasoning or explanation. As a result, Johnson needed a short-term solution which could satisfy much of the American electorate. He went to war on the sly, sending limited personnel and using passive language such as ‘advisers’ and ‘aid’ to demonstrate intent without raising alarm. Indeed, in the short term, these manoeuvres proved very popular with the American people. In 1964 he received a greater percentage of the vote (61 per cent) and a greater margin of victory (sixteen million votes) than any previous president on his way to electoral victory. Likewise, post-election polls revealed that 82% of the voting population claimed ‘world peace’ was the primary issue influencing their decision.
However, this politically wary route into war placed US forces on the back foot from the very start. By waiting until March 8,1965, to send across the first three thousand five hundred combat troops, Johnson gave Communist forces time to expand and mobilise. In 1964, the North Vietnamese navy delivered three thousand six hundred tons of weapons to the Vietcong – around three times the volume sent in 1962 and 1963 combined and the NLF used this time to reconstruct the key logistical supply line of the Ho Chi Minh trail, enabling it to now withstand the thoroughfare of trucks and motorized vehicles. By failing to set any intimidating precedent against North Vietnam, Johnson gave it free reign to prepare for battle, an error which, as predicted by many of his advisors, gravely cost America in the long run. Evidently, therefore, one can notice how Johnson’s desire to satisfy electoral feelings squandered America’s opportunity to gain the initiative from the outset and to put communist forces under pressure.
Having satisfied the electorate in the short-term, Johnson’s decision making soon left them feeling let down. In July 1965, he approved the prompt deployment of fifty thousand US troops and decided upon campaigns Rolling Thunder and Search and Destroy, his ‘July Decisions’ which, although incremental, rose American input in Vietnam to a point of no return. These steps resulted in public discontent and distrust. People increasingly believed it was immoral for the US to expend its immense power in ways inconsistent with the principles of its people. Senator George McGovern claimed the actions amounted ‘to an affront to the Constitution without equal in this century’ and Martin Luther King Jr even suggested that ‘no one who has any concern for the integrity and life of America today can ignore the present war’. Soon after his ‘July Decisions’, Johnson’s popularity plummeted, and his Gallup approval rating dropped from 70% in mid-1965 to below 40% in 1967. Likewise, in 1967, Gallup reported that approximately 70% of America felt the Johnson government had not been completely honest about Vietnam. This discontent began to bubble over across the country and protests sprung up across America. The first anti-war march, on April 17, 1965, had around fifteen thousand protestors but by October 21, 1968, seventy-five thousand activists congregated by the Lincoln Memorial in protest.
Due to this mounting opposition, Johnson had no choice but to dramatically reduce military action, thus hindering the overall effectiveness of the campaign and ultimately leading to a prolonged conflict with no clear path to victory. Incapacitating Rules of Engagement (ROEs), for instance, never allowed bombing programs such as Rolling Thunder to succeed. Initial ROEs meant everything above the 20th parallel, including Hanoi, was immune from bombing; others banned American airmen from attacking enemy Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) unless being fired upon first and more forbade the US from attacking Phuc Yen or other North Vietnamese airbases for two years. As a result, consistency and effectiveness of US air raids were poor. In one instance, US pilots could see a hundred and eleven vulnerable SAMs being transported on railcars yet could not attack them. General William W. Momyer, a commander of the US Seventh Air Force in Vietnam from 1966-68, recalled that ‘the SAMs could hit us whenever… but our rules of engagement prevented us, in most cases, from hitting back’. Likewise, Hanoi remained off limits until the late 1960s, meaning little substantial damage could be dealt to the heart of the North Vietnamese cause. It was this lack of conviction, brought about through fear of losing the electorate, which meant the American military campaign lacked the ferociousness and scale needed to inflict serious damage.
Revisionist historians are surely right to argue, therefore, that it was not the Guerilla tactics of the VC that would prove decisive in America’s struggles, but instead the domestic and political concerns of President Johnson. It is perhaps unfair and an example of the Americanisation of the post-war evaluation to deem Vietcong tactics insignificant as indeed they were not. The Vietcong successfully employed a Guerrilla doctrine which exploited American weakness and maximised Vietnamese strength. Nonetheless, these tactics could have been overcome by the far larger US military. Lacklustre bombing campaigns and tactical indecision meant pressure was slight and rarely made the Vietcong sweat and, most importantly, the root of these errors was the political and domestic constraints surrounding Johnson. By attempting to subtly sign up to war and not stir panic, he locked the US into military modes which could never win it. Simultaneously, had he not been bound by the shackles of public discontent, he could have pursued a more cut-throat initiative where American forces could exploit their advantage of size and make success more likely. Public-pleasing ROEs and half-hearted first steps were the product of Johnson’s political concerns. For Guenter Lewy, the litany of mistakes is long and serious: ‘politicians refused to loosen their grip; they prohibited certain tactics, exempted certain targets… [and] ordered bombing halts in response to domestic pressure’. Indeed, as memorably put by Alexandar Haig Jr., ‘‘The war was not lost on the battlefield in any sense of the word. It was lost in Washington’.
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