No War, No Peace: Why the Stones of the First Intifada Feel Heavier Each Day

By Aliya Okamoto Abdullaeva

10/11/2023

A Palestinian boy, Faris Odeh was living in Gaza until he was shot by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) while throwing stones at them during the Second Intifada. A week before his death, a photograph was taken of him hurling stones at an Israeli tank, which became an iconic image in representing the plight and resistance of the Palestinians. This symbolic act of stone throwing was central to the First Intifada but carried on in practice at protests since, as it came to be seen as an integral part of Palestinian identity.

The catalyst for the First Intifada, or uprising, happened on 8 December 1987, when an IDF truck collided with a car in the northern Gaza Strip, killing four Palestinians. It had been twenty years since Israeli military occupation began in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, previously annexed by Jordan and Egypt respectively, after their victory in the War of 1967. During this time, tensions were rising, with Israeli settlement construction in the Occupied Territories intensifying through the means of direct land expropriation as well as strengthening already established settlements. In addition, Palestinian living conditions were declining due to Israeli restrictions and control over vital resources such as water and electricity. Frustration amongst Palestinians led to rumours quickly spreading on the intentionality of the traffic accident, suggestive of being an act of revenge for the killing of an Israeli in Gaza a couple days prior. The same night, a funeral procession for three of the killed Palestinians took place at the Jabalia refugee camp, with attendees throwing stones at a nearby Israeli military base, starting a grassroots rebellion that would ensue until its end in 1993 with the signing of the first Oslo Accord.

The year that followed the incident, Palestinian mobilisation saw 5,385 acts of demonstrations, most memorable of which were the throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails, but also significantly included boycotts, labour strikes, and refusal to pay taxes. In the coming weeks of the Intifada’s inception, a coalition named the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) was established between four Palestinian factions, all of whom were members of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), giving organisational cohesion and sustainability to the movement. Their collaboration was realised after recognising the importance of having a shared political programme, which was that of self-determination, an end to occupation and the creation of a Palestinian state.

The UNLU importantly distributed clandestine leaflets, a medium of communication which set guidelines for political action, providing information on the uprising’s aims, which Israeli products to boycott, and scheduled strike days. Aside from its logistical uses, the leaflets incentivised, collectivised and build pride amongst the Palestinian population, dismantling patriarchal and individualistic hierarchies, as seen through the roles played by workers, women and students alike. Members of the community found ways of disengaging from Israel separate to the UNLU as well. The Popular Teaching projects were a grassroots mobilisation of alternative education that began in response to the indefinite closures of schools and universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip imposed by the Israeli government in early 1988. The Popular Teaching project sought to “Palestinianise the curriculum,” which was previously Jordanian or Egyptian and heavily controlled by Israel. A resilient educational system, it reinterpreted what constitutes a ‘classroom,’ and what resources to use, from graffiti to poetry. Therefore, underground education was an important motivator, evidenced by its eventual ban by Israel, for both children and teachers as lessons reflected Palestinian values, identities and struggles which were often censored or erased in an effort to destroy a culture and history, and subsequently a right to exist.

In addition, a key organisation that emerged during the Intifada was Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, better known by the acronym HAMAS, whom alongside the UNLU circulated their own leaflets and helped sustain the Intifada and push forth its agenda of establishing Palestinian self-sufficiency, albeit with an Islamic approach. HAMAS published their charter in 1988, necessitating the destruction of Israel, referring to its colonial practices and Zionist ideology that grounds it, and calling for the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state. Although largely non-violent in the beginning, shifting their position in response to Israeli violence, HAMAS employed their first suicide bombing, four months before the end of the Intifada. The growth of HAMAS and its engagement in more violent acts in the later years of the Intifada, became areas of contention and concern, internationally, within Palestinian leadership, and for Israel.

Pursuing an ‘Iron Fist’ policy, Israel deployed around eighty thousand soldiers to contain the Intifada. Within a year, three hundred Palestinians were killed, with an additional six hundred wounded. In contrast, with about five per cent of Palestinian activity involving firearms, only four Israeli soldiers were killed during the same time span. The spontaneity of the Intifada found the IDF unprepared and disorganised, leading to high numbers of Palestinian casualties as well as deaths through quickly implemented violent measures of control, which included the usage of rubber bullets, tear gas and sometimes live ammunition. As the occupiers, there were certain political and legal limitations on the actions of the IDF, and therefore guidelines for restraint and use of force were established to lower death rates. What followed was a policy of collective punishment, restricting electricity, imposing curfews, uprooting trees and demolishing houses. In addition, mass arrests took place, totalling to over a hundred and seventy thousand Palestinians who as prisoners were likely subject to torture. Despite this, Palestinian morale was not damaged the way Israel hoped it would be, but instead morale amongst soldiers was greatly undermined. With news and photographs of Israeli brutality against largely young and unarmed Palestinians circulating, the Intifada and struggle of the Palestinians was put on an international platform. While sentiments of support grew for Palestine, global criticism and condemnation from human rights organisations of Israel increased, particularly concerning the inhumane ways in which the IDF dealt with demonstrators. With eyes from around the world watching, the persistence of Palestinian activities and the damage the Intifada had on Israel’s economy pushed for negotiations to take place as early as 1991 with the Madrid Conference.

After a series of secret negotiations between the PLO and Israel, the Declaration of Principles (Oslo I Accord) was signed on 13 September 1993, aiming to establish a peace process that would result in a permanent resolution by 1999. More significantly, a couple days prior, the Letters of Mutual Recognition were passed between the PLO and Israel, effectively giving the means for Israel to further legitimise its position as a sovereign state, rather than a colonial enterprise. Despite detailed negotiations however, the crucial question of Palestinian refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and security and borders were not discussed. The Oslo Accords, mediated by the United States of America, recalled UN Resolution 242, calling for Israel’s withdrawal from the territories it occupied in the aftermath of the War of 1967, and created the Palestinian Authority (PA), an interim body to self-govern limited areas of the Occupied Territories. The West Bank was divided, delineated in the Oslo II Accord as Areas A, B and C, which all saw different levels of PA governance, from complete Palestinian administration and security to complete Israeli administration and security, despite promises of Palestinian autonomy. Despite its promise for eventual peace in the region, the Oslo Accords were not widely celebrated by Israelis and Palestinians alike. The Israeli right wing rejected the Accords, as it saw the PLO as a terrorist organisation. Among Palestinians, there were cautious optimists and sceptics questioning what the peace process would entail. Notably, HAMAS strongly opposed the Accords, proclaiming its betrayal of Palestinian rights.

The ‘peace process’ that marked the end of the First Intifada is best said in quotations. As scholar Nadia Naser-Najjab stated, “‘Peace’ does not mark the termination of colonial relations but instead enables them to take a different form.” Ironically, the right to self-govern given to the Palestinians through the establishment of the PA has increased their reliance on Israel. Ultimately under Israeli authority, popular census characterises the PA as corrupt and a liability, essentially leaving Palestinians without a truly representative, effective but also recognised leadership. By ‘normalising occupation’ through the frameworks of ‘peace-building’ which the Accords helped facilitate, it becomes harder for organised mass mobilisation to take place, especially through a peaceful avenue. The Second Intifada that succeeded the First Intifada by seven years is an example of this, as it was militant and violent in nature and therefore limited in popular participation, with quite different implications to the First Intifada. Since then, there have been talks of a Third Intifada on multiple occasions when conflict escalates, though nothing has been able to materialise to that scale. Nonetheless, remnants of the First Intifada remain etched in the memory of Palestinians as an inspiration and testament of united resistance. With each stone thrown, Palestinians continue to exert their existence and strengthen their resolve for independence, despite the decades of Palestinian deaths at the hands of Israel, before and after 1993.

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